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OPINION OF THE COURT
________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
Khaimraj Singh, a Guyanan national,
petitions for review of a final order of
removal grounded upon the determination
that he is an aggravated felon on account
of his conviction for touching the breast of
his cousin, who was under sixteen years of
age. The offense of conviction was 11
Del. C. § 767, “Unlawful sexual contact in
the third degree,” which provides:
A person is guilty of unlawful

sexual contact in the third degree
when the person has sexual contact
with another person or causes the
victim to have sexual contact with
the person or a third person and the
person knows that the contact is
either offensive to the victim or
occurs without the victim’s
consent.

III.B. As will appear, a pattern emerges,
causing us to conclude that, while the
formal categorical approach of Taylor
presumptively applies in assessing whether
an alien has been convicted of an
aggravated felony, in some cases the
language of the particular subsection of 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) at issue will invite
inquiry into the underlying facts of the
case, and in some cases the disjunctive
phrasing of the statute of conviction will
similarly invite inquiry into the specifics of
the conviction. But in this case, neither 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) nor 11 Del. C.
§ 767 invite inquiry into the facts
underlying Singh’s conviction. Therefore,
because Taylor’s formal categorical
approach applies to Singh’s case, we will
grant the petition for review.

The question presented on this petition
for review—whether Singh has been
convicted of the aggravated felony of
“sexual abuse of a minor,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(A)—turns on whether we
must apply the so-called “formal
categorical approach” announced in Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
Under that approach, an adjudicator “must
look only to the statutory definitions of the
prior offenses,” and may not “consider
other evidence concerning the defendant’s
prior crimes,” including, “the particular
facts underlying [a] conviction[].” Id. at
600. If we apply the formal categorical
approach, Singh has not been convicted of
the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a
minor because § 767 does not contain an
element specifying the age of the victim.
If we do not apply the formal categorical
approach, Singh has been convicted of the
aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a
minor because the victim of his sex
offense was, indeed, a minor.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings
Before the Immigration Judge and Board
of Immigration Appeals
Singh is a native and citizen of Guyana.
He was admitted to the United States in
June 1988 as an immigrant. About ten
years later, he touched the breast of his
cousin, who was under the age of sixteen.
For this, the State of Delaware charged
him under 11 Del. C. § 768, “Unlawful
sexual contact in the second degree.”
Apparently as part of a plea agreement
with the state prosecutor, Singh pled guilty
to the lesser included offense of 11 Del. C.
§ 767, “Unlawful sexual contact in the
third degree.” On May 19, 1998, the
Delaware Superior Court imposed a oneyear suspended sentence.

Our jurisprudence in the aggravated
felony area— twelve cases in all—is not a
seamless web. In order to resolve the
appeal we have found it necessary to
analyze and synthesize this body of case
law, and we do so at length, see infra Part
2

This conviction, the government
asserts, renders Singh an aggravated felon
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), which
provides that “sexual abuse of a minor” is
an aggravated felony. 1
Under 8

property derived from
specific unlawful activity)
if the amount of the funds
exceeded $10,000;
(E) an offense described
in–
(i) section 842(h) or (i) of
Title 18, or section 844(d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of
that title (relating to
explosive materials
offenses);
(ii) section 922(g)(1), (2),
(3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o),
(p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h)
of Title 18 (relating to
firearms offenses); or
(iii) section 5861 of Title
26 (relating to firearms
offenses);
(F) a crime of violence (as
defined in section 16 of
Title 18, but not including
a purely political offense)
for which the term of
imprisonment at least one
year;
(G) a theft offense
(including receipt of stolen
property) or burglary
offense for which the term
of imprisonment at least
one year;
(H) an offense described in
section 875, 876, 877, or
1202 of Title 18 (relating
to the demand for or
receipt of ransom);

1

“Sexual abuse of a minor” is but one
of the dozens of aggravated felonies
catalogued in the twenty-one subsections
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Because the
discussion that follows in this opinion
draws on many of those subsections, we
rescribe the statute in full for the
convenience of the reader:
The term “aggravated felony” means—
(A) murder, rape, or sexual
abuse of a minor;
(B) illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance (as
defined in section 802 of
Title 21), including a drug
trafficking crime (as
defined in section 924(c) of
Title 18);
(C) illicit trafficking in
firearms or destructive
devices (as defined in
section 921 of Title 18) or
in explosive materials (as
defined in section 841(c) of
that title);
(D) an offense described in
section 1956 of Title 18
(relating to laundering of
monetary instruments) or
section 1957 of that title
(relating to engaging in
monetary transactions in
3

(I) an offense described in
section 2251, 2251A, or
2252 of Title 18 (relating
to child pornography);
(J) an offense described in
section 1962 of Title 18
(relating to racketeer
influenced corrupt
organizations), or an
offense described in
section 1084 (if it is a
second or subsequent
offense) or 1955 of that
title (relating to gambling
offenses), for which a
sentence of one year
imprisonment or more may
be imposed;
(K) an offense that—
(i) relates to the owning,
controlling, managing, or
supervising of a
prostitution business;
(ii) is described in section
2421, 2422, or 2423 of
Title 18 (relating to
transportation for the
purpose of prostitution) if
committed for commercial
advantage; or
(iii) is described in any of
sections 1581-1585 or
1588-1591 of Title 18
(relating to peonage,
slavery, involuntary
servitude, and trafficking
in persons);
(L) an offense described

in—
(i) section 793 (relating to
gathering or transmitting
national defense
information), 798 (relating
to disclosure of classified
information), 2153
(relating to sabotage) or
2381 or 2382 (relating to
treason) of Title 18;
(ii) section 421 of Title 50
(relating to protecting the
identity of undercover
intelligence agents); or
(iii) section 421 of Title 50
(relating to protecting the
identity of undercover
agents);
(M) an offense that—
(i) involves fraud or deceit
in which the loss to the
victim or victims exceeds
$10,000; or
(ii) is described in section
7201 of Title 26 (relating
to tax evasion) in which the
revenue loss to the
Government exceeds
$10,000;
(N) an offense described in
paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of
section 1324(a) of this title
(relating to alien
smuggling), except in the
case of a first offense for
which the alien has
affirmatively shown that
the alien committed the
4

offense for the
purpose of assisting,
abetting, or aiding
only the alien's
spouse, child, or
parent (and no other
individual) to
violate a provision
of this chapter
(O) an offense described in
section 1325(a) or 1326 of
this title committed by an
alien who was previously
deported on the basis of a
conviction for an offense
described in another
subparagraph of this
paragraph;
(P) an offense (i) which
either is falsely making,
forging, counterfeiting,
mutilating, or altering a
passport or instrument in
violation of section 1543 of
Title 18 or is described in
section 1546(a) of such
title (relating to document
fraud) and (ii) for which
the term of imprisonment is
at least 12 months, except
in the case of a first offense
for which the alien has
affirmatively shown that
the alien committed the
offense for the purpose of
assisting, abetting, or
aiding only the alien's
spouse, child, or parent

(and no other individual) to
violate a provision of this
chapter;
(Q) an offense relating to a
failure to appear by a
defendant for service of
sentence if the underlying
offense is punishable by
imprisonment for a term of
5 years or more;
(R) an offense relating to
commercial bribery,
counterfeiting, forgery, or
trafficking in vehicles the
identification numbers of
which have been altered
for which the term of
imprisonment is at least
one year;
(S) an offense relating to
obstruction of justice,
perjury or subornation of
perjury, or bribery of a
witness, for which the term
of imprisonment is at least
one year;
(T) an offense relating to a
failure to appear before a
court pursuant to a court
order to answer to or
dispose of a charge of a
felony for which a sentence
of 2 years' imprisonment or
more may be imposed; and
(U) an attempt or
conspiracy to commit an
offense described in this
paragraph.
5

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony is
removable. The Immigration Judge (IJ)
agreed with the government’s position,
noting that “the sentencing order of the
[Delaware] Court reflects clearly, under
special conditions of probation, ‘note:
victim is under 16 years of age.’” Citing
18 U.S.C. § 3509(2) (which defines the
age of majority as 18), the IJ explained
that “the victim was under 16 years of age
and, consequently, would be classified as
a minor.” The IJ then looked to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509(8) for the definition of “sexual
abuse,” which includes “sexually explicit
conduct”:

designated in the statute, has indeed
. . . engaged in sexual abuse of a
minor as defined in Title 18.
The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision without
opinion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).2
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and our
decision in Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001), we have
jurisdiction to consider our jurisdiction
over this timely petition for review of a
final decision of the BIA.

II. Standard of Review
This case turns on a question of
statutory interpretation—specifically, the
meaning and application of the aggravated
felony of “sexual abuse of a minor.” As
we noted in Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d

The term sexually explicit conduct
includes touching of one’s breast
under [18 U.S.C. § 3509(9)(A)].
Consequently, the Court finds that
the respondent has engaged in
sexually explicit conduct of a child.
Likewise, the Court would find that
the respondent’s conviction,
notwithstanding the fact that the
age of the victim is not specifically

2

Singh also challenges the BIA’s
procedure for affirmance without
opinion. We approved these
streamlining regulations in Dia v.
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc), which was decided after Singh
filed his opening brief. Although Dia
may not dispose of Singh’s
nondelegation and judicial economy
arguments against the streamlining
regulations, those arguments would be
better addressed to the Court en banc. At
all events, our resolution of this case on
alternative grounds avoids the need to
confront the novel questions raised in
Singh’s challenge to the streamlining
regulations.

The term applies to an offense described
in this paragraph whether in violation of
Federal or State law and applies to such
an offense in violation of the law of a
foreign country for which the term of
imprisonment was completed within the
previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (including any
effective date), the term applies
regardless of whether the conviction was
entered before, on, or after September
30, 1996.
6

465, 467 (3d Cir. 2002), “there is some
confusion surrounding the proper standard
of review in cases such as this.” Patel,
which was an aggravated felony case,
discusses at length the role of Chevron
deference in cases interpreting the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
generally, and the aggravated felony
statute of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) in
particular. In our most recent aggravated
felony case, we described the scope of our
Chevron deference thus:

Board’s interpretation, so long as it
is reasonable. Id.
Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir.
2004).
Canvassing the dozen aggravated
felony cases decided by this Court, one
indisputable and surprising pattern
emerges: We have never affirmatively
deferred to an interpretation by the BIA (or
an IJ) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), i.e., of
whether the crime at issue constitutes an
aggravated felony. Many times we have
not even discussed Chevron deference to
the BIA, irrespective of whether we
ultimately agreed or disagreed with the
Board. See Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d
225 (3d Cir. 2003); Wilson v. Ashcroft,
350 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2003); Bovkun v.
Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d
Cir. 1999). We also have suggested that
we conduct de novo review because the
question goes to our jurisdiction. See
Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162, 165 (3d
Cir. 2004); Valansi, 278 F.3d at 207-08
(citing cases). Twice we have declined to
reach the question of deference because
we concluded that our result would be the
same on deferential review as it would on
plenary review. See Patel, 294 F.3d at
468; Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 251
(3d Cir. 2001).
In two cases, we
acknowledged that we must defer to the
BIA if the statute’s meaning is ambiguous,
but both times we held that the BIA’s
interpretation conflicted with the statute’s
plain meaning. See Lee, 368 F.3d at 22425; Valansi, 278 F.3d at 208. In yet
another case we affirmatively held that the

“The first step in interpreting a
statute is to determine ‘whether the
language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard
to the particular dispute in the
case.’” [Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278
F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2002)]
(quoting Marshak v. Treadwell,
240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001)).
If the statutory meaning is clear,
our inquiry is at an end. Id. If the
statutory meaning is not clear, we
must try to discern Congress’ intent
using the ordinary tools of statutory
construction.
See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
447-48 (1987). “If, by employing
traditional tools of statutory
construction, we determine that
Congress’ intent is clear, that is the
end of the matter.” Valansi, 278
F.3d at 208 (quoting Bell v. Reno,
218 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2000)). If
we are unable to discern Congress’
intent using the normal tools of
statutory construction, we will
generally give deference to the

7

BIA’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 16,
which is incorporated by reference in the
aggravated felony statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), was not subject to the
general principles of Chevron, but that,
even if it was, the specific interpretation at
issue was unreasonable and therefore not
entitled to deference. See Francis v. Reno,
269 F.3d 162, 168 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2001).
Finally, two decisions appear to be more
deferential to the BIA. In Gerbier v.
Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2002),
we found the BIA’s interpretation
“persuasive” (hardly a strong general
endorsement), while in Steele v. Blackman,
236 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2001), we
stated that “if a statute administered by the
INS is ambiguous, and the BIA has
provided a reasonable interpretation of its
language, we must simply ask whether the
BIA’s construction is a permissible one.”
Even in Steele, however, we looked more
closely into the BIA’s interpretation,
finding it “troublesome,” bu t we
“assume[d] its validity” because even the
BIA’s own interpretation of the statute did
not support its disposition of the case. 236
F.3d at 136 & n.5.

expertise in a meaningful way’ but
presents instead ‘a pure question of
statutory construction for the courts to
decide.’” (quoting Sandoval v. Reno, 166
F.3d 225, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
446 (1987))) (alteration in original)).
Second, we have been mindful, as in
Nugent, 367 F.3d at 165, and Valansi, 278
F.3d at 207-08, that although the statute is
part of Title 8, and not Title 28, of the
United States Code, it nonetheless controls
o u r j u r i s d ic t i o n (via 8 U.S . C .
§ 1252(a)(2)(C)) and we normally consider
jurisdictional matters de novo.
Moreover, here the IJ offered no reason
for his decision not to apply Taylor’s
categorical approach; the BIA, by
affirming without opinion, gave no
considered and authoritative agency-wide
interpretation of the statute; and now on
petition for review, the government’s
entire position on deference consists of a
single citation to an admittedly vague
comment from this Court in Patel, 294
F.3d at 467 (“[S]ome deference is still
required under Chevron, even though we
are reviewing a purely legal question such
as the BIA’s interpretation of a criminal
statute.”). Under all these circumstances,
we conclude that the IJ’s summary
application of § 1101(a)(43)(A)—it can
hardly be described as a full-blown
reasoned interpretation— is not entitled to
deference. As we have done in previous
cases, however, we will here expressly
reserve decision on whether some BIA
interpretations of § 1101(a)(43) are
entitled to deference.

Why then have we never found it
necessary and appropriate to defer to the
BIA’s or IJ’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)? First, as we explained in
Francis, the interpretation and exposition
of criminal law is a task outside the BIA’s
sphere of special competence. See 269
F.3d at 168; see also Drakes, 240 F.3d at
250 (“Chevron deference is not required
where the interpretation of a particular
statute does not ‘implicate[] agency

8

III. Discussion

601, the Taylor Court adopted the “formal
categorical approach.”

Some of our cases interpreting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) have employed the rule of
Taylor, described there as the “formal
categorical approach,” 495 U.S. at 600.
See, e.g., Francis, 269 F.3d at 171-72.
Taylor addressed the meaning and
application of the term “burglary” in 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), which imposes enhanced
sentences on defendants convicted under
the unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), when the
defendant has three prior convictions for
specified offenses, including “burglary.”
Taylor’s analysis can be readily imported
here, because 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) is
similar to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) in that it too
enumerates offenses, conviction of which
places an alien in the category of
“aggravated felon.”
Taylor put the
“general issue” in interpreting this sort of
statute as follows:

The facts of Taylor provide an apt
illustration of the principle at work: Taylor
had been twice convicted of second degree
burglary in Missouri. Under Missouri law,
second degree burglary encompassed
several discrete sets of statutory elements.
As the Court explained, “All seven
offenses required entry into a structure, but
they varied as to the type of structure and
the means of entry involved.” Id. at 578
n.1. Compared with the definition of
“generic burglary” adopted by the
Court—“convict[ion] of any crime,
regardless of its exact definition or label,
having the basic elements of unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a
building or structure, with intent to commit
a crime,” id. at 599—not all variants of
Missouri second degree burglary qualified
under the federal sentencing enhancement
statute. Since the formal categorical
approach does not permit looking beyond
the literal elements of the statute (i.e., to
the facts supporting the convictions), the
Court could not say that Taylor had been
p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t ed o f c ri m es
encompassing the elements of generic
burglary. See id. at 602. Accordingly, the
Court remanded for further development
on the question of “which of [the M issouri
second degree burglary] statutes were the
bases for Taylor’s prior convictions.” Id.
The inquiry was limited to the statute of
conviction, however, as the formal
categorical approach “generally requires
the trial court to look only to the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of

whether the sentencing court in
applying § 924(e) must look only to
the statutory definitions of the prior
offenses, or whether the court may
consider other evidence concerning
the defendant’s prior crimes. The
Courts of Appeals uniformly have
held that § 924(e) mandates a
formal categorical approach,
looking only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses,
and not to the particular facts
underlying those convictions.
495 U.S. at 600. Citing “the practical
difficulties and potential unfairness [to a
defendant] of a factual approach,” id. at

9

the prior offense.” Id. The Taylor Court
also acknowledged that, under limited
circumstances, resort to the charging
instrument may be permissible: “[The
formal categorical approach] may permit
the sentencing court to go beyond the mere
fact of conviction in a narrow range of
cases where a jury was actually required to
find all the [necessary] elements.” Id.

unnecessary for our purposes to give a
comprehensive definition of “sexual abuse
of a minor,” and we reserve decision on
that question. It is sufficient to say that
“sexual abuse of a minor” entails some
conduct involving a minor, i.e., someone
under the age of eighteen.
This is enough to defeat the
government’s argument, for § 767 says
nothing whatsoever about the age of the
victim. In full, the statute under which
Singh was convicted reads:

The questions presented in this case are
readily apparent: Does Taylor’s formal
categorical approach apply to “sexual
abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), and if it does, does a
conviction under 11 Del. C. § 767
nonetheless qualify as a conviction for
sexual abuse of a minor? We find it more
efficient to address the second question
first.

A person is guilty of unlawful
sexual contact in the third degree
when the person has sexual contact
with another person or causes the
victim to have sexual contact with
the person or a third person and the
person knows that the contact is
either offensive to the victim or
occurs without the victim’s
consent.

A. Under the Formal Categorical
Approach of Taylor, Does a Conviction
Under
11 Del. C. § 767 Qualify as a Conviction
for “Sexual Abuse of a Minor”?

Since a finding of the age of the victim is
not required for conviction, § 767 does not
appear to be an aggravated felony (or at
least not the aggravated felony of sexual
abuse of a minor).

The government first argues that, even
under the formal categorical approach, a
conviction under 11 Del. C. § 767 is a
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor. To
evaluate this argument, we follow the
Supreme Court’s two-step approach in
Taylor, where it first construed the term
“burglary” in the federal statute, 495 U.S.
at 590-99, and then compared the elements
of the Missouri statutes to the federal
definition, id. at 602. The IJ looked to 18
U.S.C. § 3509(2), (8), and (9) to define
“sexual abuse of a minor.” While we have
no quarrel with this approach, it is

In the face of the literal and
unambiguous text of § 767, the
government argues that the statute
nonetheless criminalizes sexual abuse of a
minor. Of course it is irrelevant that
sexually abusing a minor may be sufficient
for conviction under the statute; what
matters is whether such conduct is
necessary for such a conviction. The
government seems to argue that the overall
statutory scheme in Delaware establishes
10

that sexual abuse of a minor is necessary
for a conviction under § 767. Even
assuming that appeals to statutes other
than the statute of conviction are within
the bounds of the formal categorical
approach, we still cannot agree with the
government’s position.

statutory scheme. For example, 11 Del. C.
§§ 767-773 are the gamut of traditional sex
offenses under Delaware law, from
misdemeanor sexual assault to first degree
rape.
Adopting the government’s
argument would imply not only that § 767
is an offense against a child, but also that
§§ 768-773 are as well. This would have
the astonishing result that all sex offenses
in Delaware (as Delaware does not define
any general sex offenses outside this list)
require that the victim be a child. These
problems only reinforce our conclusion
from the plain meaning of the statute: 11
Del. C. § 767 does not include as an
element that the victim be a minor, and
accordingly, under the formal categorical
approach of Taylor, Singh does not stand
convicted of sexual abuse of a minor.

10 Del. C. § 922(a)(19) provides the
Delaware Family Court with exclusive
original crimin al jurisdic tion over
“unlawful sexual conduct in the third
degree against a child under 11 Del. C.
§ 767.”
Similarly, 11 Del. C.
§ 1112(b)(4)(A) defines “sexual offender”
as a person who has been convicted of
“any sexual offense upon a child under 16
years of age under § 767, § 768, § 769,
§ 770, § 771, § 772, § 773 . . . .” The
government would have us read these
provisions as definitions of § 767. We do
not agree. There are at least two problems
with the government’s approach. First,
“against a child” and “upon a child,” in 10
Del. C. § 922(a)(19) and 11 Del. C.
§ 1112(b)(4)(A), respectively, are better
read not as definitions of Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11, § 767, but rather as qualifications or
limitations on the§ 767 convictions that
are intended to be within the scope of the
jurisdictional and sex offender statutes.
Unless these phrases are read as qualifiers,
they are superfluous—why not, in
§ 1112(b)(4)(A), simply omit “upon a
child under 16 years of age” if the statutes
referred to already incorporate such a
notion?

B. Does the Formal Categorical
Approach of Taylor Apply to the
Aggravated Felony of “Sexual Abuse of
a Minor”?
Because the IJ’s decision cannot stand
if we apply Taylor’s formal categorical
approach, we mu st turn to the
government’s fallback argument that the
formal categorical approach does not apply
to “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A ).
If the
government is free from the strictures of
the formal categorical approach, we would
simply review the IJ’s decision under the
deferential substantial evidence standard,
evaluating whether the factual record
before the IJ could fairly support the
conclusion that Singh was convicted of
sexual abuse of a minor. See Dia, 353
F.3d at 247-49 (describing the substantial

A second and independent problem
with the government’s proposed reading is
that it leads to absurdities elsewhere in the
11

categorical approach.3
Thus, in the
sections that follow, we address the other
nine cases, which all (explicitly or
implicitly) take a position on Taylor’s
applicability.

evidence standard). As the record supports
this conclusion—indeed, Singh concedes
that, as a factual matter, he was convicted
for touching the breast of his minor
cousin—we would dismiss the petition if
the formal categorical approach did not
apply here. But for the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the formal
categorical approach does apply.

a. Cases employing the formal
categorical approach of Taylor
We expressly invoked and applied
Taylor’s formal categorical approach in
Francis. There, the question presented
was whether “a state misdemeanor
conviction for vehicular homicide is a
‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 16,” 269 F.3d at 164, which is
incorporated by reference in the definition
of “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S .C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F). We concluded that the

1. Our prior aggravated felony
jurisprudence
We have decided a dozen cases
implicating 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), and at
times we have applied the formal
categorical approach of Taylor, and at
other times we have not. (In the latter
instances, though we have never explicitly
considered and rejected Taylor’s approach,
our decisions cannot be fairly read as
employing the formal categorical
approach.) The question here, then, is
whether sexual abuse of a minor under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) is more akin to
those provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
to which we have applied the formal
categorical approach, or to those to which
we have not.
We begin with a
comprehensive survey of this Court’s
aggravated felony jurisprudence. The
United States Supreme Court has not
decided any case involving 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43), so we consider only our
own cases in this survey. Three of the
twelve cases we have decided, see supra
Part II, do not even implicitly involve the
question whether to use Taylor’s formal

3

Two of these cases—Lee and
Patel—turn on whether certain federal
criminal offenses are directly identified
in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See Lee, 368
F.3d at 224 (holding that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) is the exclusive
category for federal tax offenses, and
thus that federal tax offenses are not
covered by 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(43)
(M)(i)); Patel, 294 F.3d at 470 (holding
that the reference in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(N) to “alien smuggling”
does not overcome the specific crossreference in that section to statute
criminalizing alien harboring, of which
petitioner had been convicted). The third
case, Graham, resolves a scrivener’s
error in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and
implicates Taylor only indirectly. We
return to Graham infra Part III.B.1.c.
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petitioner’s conviction was not a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and
therefore that he was not an aggravated
felon. Although we were able to reach this
result on an analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 16 that
did not implicate Taylor, Francis, 269
F.3d at 168-71, we also held in the
alternative that, under the formal
categorical approach, Francis’s conviction
did not satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s
requirement that a crime of violence be
one that, “by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the
offense.”

continued:
On its face, homicide by vehicle is
certainly not an offense that “by its
nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the
person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing
the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
The BIA acknowledged that § 3732
involves a range of behavior that
“may or may not” fall under
§ 16(b).
The categorical approach does “permit
the sentencing court to go beyond the mere
fact of conviction in a narrow range of
cases where a jury was actually required to
find all the elements of [the relevant]
generic [offense].” Taylor, 495 U.S. at
602. Here, the criminal complaint stated:

We explained that under the formal
categorical approach,
we must look to Pennsylvania’s
definition of homicide by vehicle. .
. . 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3732 provides:
Any person who unintentionally
causes the death of another person
while engaged in the violation of
any law of this Commonwealth or
municipal ordinance applying to the
operation or use of a vehicle or to
the regulation of traffic except
section 3731 (relating to driving
under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance) is guilty of
homicide by veh icle, a
misdemeanor of the first degree,
when the violation is the cause of
death.

Southbound on Route 95 in the
vicinity of Comly Street the
defendant unintentionally caused
the death of the decedent # 1 Harry
B. Rutter, Driver of vehicle # 1, by
operating a 198 5 Chevrolet
Caprice, Pa. License ADB 7268,
while his operating privilege was
suspended, and in such a manner as
to cause a eight vehicle accident
between four cars, one van, and
three tractor trailers and a near miss
by a tanker truck carrying 8000
gallons of gasoline, causing the
deaths of two people and injuring a
third.

75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3732.

(emphasis added).

Francis, 269 F.3d at 171-72.

We

Francis was therefore charged with the
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“unintentional” conduct, of operating an
automobile in such a manner as to cause a
car accident resulting in two deaths.

the BIA in applying 8 U.S .C .
§ 1101(a)(43)(B), which categorizes as an
aggravated felony “illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance (as defined in section
802 of Title 21), including a drug
trafficking crime (as defined in section
924(c) of Title 18).” In Steele, our first
case to examine the hypothetical federal
felony approach, we explained it this way:

Id. at 172 (some citations omitted).
As Francis’s predicate “violation of
[the] law” for purposes of 75 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 3732 was driving with a suspended
license, and not something that “by its
nature, involves a substantial risk [of]
physical force,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), we
could not agree with the BIA that his
offense was a crime of violence.
Significantly, we disagreed with the BIA’s
conclusion that Francis’s conduct involved
a substantial risk of physical force because
it was reckless, stating: “It may well have
been [reckless]. However, recklessness
was not charged, and he was not convicted
of an offense requiring that mens rea.”
Francis, 269 F.3d at 173. In sum, the BIA
reasoned from the facts supporting
Francis’s conv iction, but we felt
constrained to grant the petition for review
by applying Taylor’s formal categorical
approach and confining our inquiry to the
statute of conviction, illuminated by the
charging instrument.

Section 924(c)(2) of Title 18
defines “drug trafficking crime” as
meaning “any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substance
Act[,] . . . the Controlled Substance
Import and Export Act[s] . . . or the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act . . . .” Accordingly, the BIA
finds within [this] category of
aggravated felony convictions any
federal conviction for a violation of
one of the specified statutes that is
a felony conviction under federal
law, i.e., a conviction for an offense
punishable by imprisonment for
over one year. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559. M ore relevant for present
purposes, the BIA understands this
. . . category to encompass
convictions for state offenses,
however characterized by the state,

Three other cases—Steele, Gerbier,
and Wilson—apply Taylor through their
use of the “hypothetical federal felony” (or
“hypothetical federal conviction”)
approach.4 This method was developed by

qualifies as well. See Gerbier, 280 F.3d
at 313. In practice, “illicit trafficking in
a controlled substance” works very much
like “crime of violence” (as discussed
supra in Francis), so we will discuss it
no further than to say that our decisions
involving it are consistent with Taylor’s
categorical approach.

4

The hypothetical federal felony
approach is only one “route” to
classification as an aggravated felony
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); “illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance”
14

if those offenses would
be “punishable” under
o n e o f t h e t h re e
specified federal statutes
if federally prosecuted,
so long as the
hypoth etical federa l
conviction would be a
felony under federal law,
i.e., would be punishable
by
a
term
of
imprisonment of over
one year.

which an alien ‘could be convicted
and punished’ under the cited
federal laws.” Matter of Barrett[,
20 I. & N. Dec. 171, 174 (BIA
1990)].
Steele, 236 F.3d at 135-36 (some
alterations in original). The hypothetical
federal felony approach is essentially the
formal categorical approach of Taylor, as
applied to a specific federal statute.
Though we did not actually approve the
hypothetical federal felony approach in
Steele, we accepted it arguendo, because
even it did not support the BIA’s
disposition—the proposed hypothetical
federal felony required a finding of an
additional, prior drug conviction, a prior
conviction that, though existing in fact,
had not been proven in the course of
Steele’s state criminal proceedings. Id. at
137. We thus granted Steele’s petition for
review. A little over a year later, in
Gerbier, we did adopt the BIA’s
hypothetical federal felony approach to 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 280 F.3d at 30811. But as in Steele, Gerbier’s status as a
recidivist had not been litigated or
otherwise decided in his state criminal
proceeding, and we therefore granted his
petition for review. Id. at 317.

This hypothetical federal
conviction approach “require[s] a
comparison between the elements
of the [state] drug offense and [the
elements of] a federal drug
provision referenced in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(2) . . . .” Matter of Davis[,
20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 544 (BIA
1992)]. Since the basis for the
incapacities under the Immigration
Act is “convict[ion] of an
aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a), the Board looks to what
t h e c o n v icting court m u st
necessarily have found to support
the conviction and not to other
conduct in which the defendant
may have engaged in connection
with the offense. Thus where, as
here, the Service is relying on a
state misdemeanor conviction, the
requirements of this . . . category of
“aggravated felony convictions” are
“satisfied [only] by proving a
conviction that includes all the
elements of [a felony] offense for

In Wilson, 350 F.3d 377, the third case
in our hypothetical-federal-felony trilogy,
we again granted the petition for review.
There, the proposed hypothetical federal
felony— 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which is
the general federal felony criminal
prohibition on unauthorized manufacture,
distribution, and possession with intent to
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distribute
of
controlled
substances—included an escape clause
making distribution of “a small amount of
marihuana for no remuneration” a
misdemean or.
S e e 21 U .S.C .
§ 841(b)(1)(D) and (b)(4). Wilson had
possessed with the intent to distribute a
small amount of marijuana, a misdemeanor
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(11). 5
Wilson, 350 F.3d at 381. He argued to this
Court that, because his state conviction did
not necessarily imply that he sought
remuneration for his distribution, it could
not therefore be shown that his conduct
would have been a felony under federal
controlled substance law—he might have
been able to invoke the escape clause. Id.

analogous to a federal felony, we look to
the elements of the statutory state offense,
not to the specific facts.” Wilson, 350 F.3d
at 381. “Since the state statutory elements
would be satisfied by proof of either
distribution or possession with intent to
distribute, we cannot draw the federal
analogy by presuming that the statute only
covers possession.” Id. at 382. Wilson
may thus represent the zenith of our
faithfulness to Taylor.
Two other cases also follow Taylor’s
formal categorical approach— though only
silently (in the case of Bovkun) or weakly
(in the case of Drakes). Although we did
not cite Taylor in Bovkun, we plainly
followed the formal categorical approach.
There, the petitioner had been convicted of
ma king te rr or istic thr ea ts u n d er
Pennsylvania law,6 and the government

The government countered that
Wilson’s conviction was for possession,
not distribution (though both distribution
and possession-with-intent were included
in New Jersey’s law, see supra note 5),
and that he therefore would not have been
eligible for the escape clause. We rejected
the government’s invitation to look beyond
the New Jersey statute itself, citing Steele
and Gerbier for the proposition that “in
evaluating whether a state violation is

6

In full, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706
(1998) (in effect at the time of Bovkun’s
conviction) provided:
A person is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first
degree if he threatens to
commit any crime of
violence with intent to
terrorize another or to
cause evacuation of a
building, place of
assembly, or facility of
public transportation, or
otherwise to cause serious
public inconvenience, or in
reckless disregard of the
risk of causing such terror
or inconvenience.

5

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1)
provides that it is unlawful “[t]o
manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to
possess or have under his control with
intent to manufacture, distribute or
dispense, a controlled dangerous
substance or controlled substance
analog.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:355(b)(11) provides that marijuana is such
a controlled substance.
16

sought to classify him as an aggravated
felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 16 by
reference), for committing “a crime of
violence.” 7 Bovkun argued that “mere
public inconvenience” would not qualify
as a crime of violence, but we rejected his
argument because it confused the actus
reus of the offense (“threat[] to commit a
crime of violence”) and the mens rea
(“with intent to . . . or reckless disregard of
. . .”). Bovkun, 283 F.3d at 170. We held
that it was the actus reus of the state
offense that had to be aligned with the
federal statute, and on that basis we
concluded that a Pennsylvania conviction
for making terroristic threats was a crime
of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.

noted above, see supra Part III.A
(discussing Taylor’s two-step approach),
Taylor requires both interpretation of the
federal statute describing the offense, and
a comparison with the statute of criminal
conviction.
Though most of our
aggravated felony cases have turned on the

defraud, deceive or injure
another person, or knowing
that the person is
facilitating a fraud or injury
to be perpetrated by
anyone, the person:
(1) Alters any written
instrument of another
person without the other
person’s authority; or
(2) Makes, completes,
executes, authenticates,
issues or transfers any
written instrument which
purports to be the act of
another person, whether
real or fictitious, who did
not authorize that act, or to
have been executed at a
time or place or in a
numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case or
to be a copy of an original
when no original existed;
or
(3) Possesses a written
instrument, knowing that it
was made, completed or
altered under
circumstances constituting
forgery.

Finally, in Drakes, we considered 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), which classifies
as an aggravated felony “an offense
relating to . . . forgery.” Though the facts
were not entirely clear, the petitioner had
been convicted of second-degree forgery
under Delaware law in connection with
providing a false name to the Delaware
State Police during a traffic stop.8 As

7

In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)
defines a “crime of violence as “an
offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or
property of another.”
8

In relevant part, 11 Del. C. § 861
provides:
(a) A person is guilty of
forgery when, intending to
17

second step, Drakes concentrated more on
the first. In Drakes, we discussed at length
the meaning of “forgery” in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(R). See 240 F.3d at 248-50.
Upon determinin g that “Congress
evidenced an intent to define forgery in its
broadest sense,” id. at 249, it became easy
to conclude that 11 Del. C. § 861 came
within the wide sweep of the offenses
described in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R),
see Drakes, 240 F.3d at 250. Thus Drakes
only briefly touched on Taylor’s second
step—the formal categorical approach as
we have been discussing it.

F.3d at 226 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:204 10 ); Valansi, 278 F.3d at 210 (quoting 18

(1) creates or reinforces a
false impression, including
false impressions as to law,
value, intention or other
state of mind; but
deception as to a person’s
intention to perform a
promise shall not be
inferred from the fact alone
that he did not
subsequently perform the
promise;
(2) prevents another from
acquiring information
which would affect his
judgment of a transaction;
or
(3) fails to correct a false
impression which the
deceiver previously created
or reinforced, or which the
deceiver knows to be
influencing another to
whom he stands in a
fiduciary or confidential
relationship.

b. Cases not employing the formal
categorical approach of Taylor
We turn now to the cases in which we
did not confine ourselves to the formal
categorical approach of Taylor. All three
such cases—Nugent, Munroe, and
Valansi—concerned 8 U .S.C .
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which defines as an
aggravated felony an offense that
“involves fraud or deceit in which the loss
to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”
In all three cases, the relevant criminal
statute did not include a “loss greater than
$10,000” element. See Nugent, 367 F.3d
at 168 n.2 (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§
3922(a)9); Munroe,
252

10

In full, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:20-4
provides:
A person is guilty of theft
if he purposely obtains
property of another by
deception. A person
deceives if he purposely:
a. Creates or reinforces a
false impression, including
false impressions as to law,

9

In full, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3922(a)
provides:
A person is guilty of theft
if he intentionally obtains
or withholds property of
another by deception. A
person deceives if he
intentionally:
18

U.S.C. § 656 11 ).12 Yet in these cases we
expressly rested our holding on the
value, intention or
other state of mind,
and including, but
not limited to, a
false impression that
the person is
soliciting or
collecting funds for
a charitable purpose;
but deception as to a
person’s intention to
perform a promise
shall not be inferred
from the fact alone
that he did not
subsequently
perform the
promise;
b. Prevents another from
acquiring information
which would affect his
judgment of a transaction;
or
c. Fails to correct a false
impression which the
deceiver previously created
or reinforced, or which the
deceiver knows to be
influencing another to
whom he stands in a
fiduciary or confidential
relationship.
The term “deceive” does
not, however, include
falsity as to matters having
no pecuniary significance,
or puffing or exaggeration
by statements unlikely to
deceive ordinary persons in

the group addressed.
11

In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 656
provides:
Whoever, being an officer,
director, agent or employee
of, or connected in any
capacity with any . . .
national bank . . .
embezzles, abstracts,
purloins or willfully
misapplies any of the
moneys, funds or credits of
such bank . . . shall be
[fined and/or imprisoned].
We also note that in Valansi’s
plea agreement, she stipulated (for
Sentencing Guidelines purposes) only
that the value of the embezzled funds
“was in excess of $1,000.” Valansi, 278
F.3d at 206.
12

Although none of these statutes has
an amount-of-loss element (i.e., some
minimum threshold amount of loss that
must be met for a conviction), there are
cognate statutes that do. See, e.g., Cal.
Penal Code § 487(a) (grand theft is
committed “[w]hen the money, labor, or
real or personal property taken is of a
value exceeding four hundred dollars
($400)”); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9A.56.030(1)(a) (theft in the first
degree is theft of “[p]roperty or services
which exceed(s) one thousand five
hundred dollars in value other than a
firearm”).
19

underlying facts about the amount of loss
involved: In Nugent, 367 F.3d at 169, the
bad check at issue was in the amount of
$4831.26 (and thus insufficient to support
the aggravated felony classification); in
Munroe, 353 F.3d at 226, several bad
checks written by the petitioner totaled in
excess of $10,000 (and thus were
sufficient to support the aggravated felony
classification).

required element. Some but not all
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 656
qualify as an aggravated felony
under that definition: a conviction
for embezzlement with specific
intent to defraud qualifies as an
offense involving fraud or deceit,
and thus an aggravated felony; a
conviction with only the specific
intent to injure does not.

Valansi, in which the petitioner had
embezzled over $400,000 in cash and
checks in her capacity as a bank teller, 278
F.3d at 205, bears further discussion. The
monetary threshold was clearly reached in
Valansi. See 278 F.3d at 209 (“Valansi
does not dispute that her conviction
s a ti s f ie s t he $ 10 ,0 0 0 m o n e t a ry
requirement.”). The case turned instead on
whether Valansi’s crime “involve[d] fraud
or deceit.” In an extensive discussion of
18 U.S.C. § 656, the Court focused on the
mens rea requirement that had been
judicially imposed on the statute: The
embezzler must do so “with the intent to
injure or defraud the bank.” Valansi, 278
F.3d 210 (citing United States v.
Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1024 (3d Cir.
1978) (citing United States v. Schmidt, 471
F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1972))). We held that
this
disjunctive mens
rea
requirement—either intent to defraud or
intent to injure suffices— put the statute
with one foo t in 8 U.S .C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M )(i) and one foot out:

Valansi, 278 F.3d at 217.
Under a strict reading of Taylor’s
formal categorical approach, this would be
the end of the story, because a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 656 does not necessarily
establish fraudulent intent any more than
Singh’s conviction under 11 Del. C. § 767
necessarily establishes sexual abuse of a
minor (because, after all, some but not all
convictions under 11 Del. C. § 767 involve
a minor victim). The Valansi panel went
on, however:
We have cautioned that where “a
criminal statute on its face fits the
INA’s deportability classification .
. . [,][t]o go beyond the offense as
charged and scrutinize the
underlying facts would change our
inquiry from a jurisdictionalone into a full consideration
of the merits. Such an approach would fly
in the face of the jurisdiction limiting
language of IIRIRA.” Drakes, 240 F.3d at
247-48. However, in this case we have
determined that the criminal statute does
not fit squarely within the INA’s
deportability classification because some,
but not all, of the convictions under 18
U.S.C. § 656 qualify as offenses involving
fraud or deceit. Because we are unable to

The
p la in
meaning
of
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) defines an
aggravated felony as an offense that
has fraud or deceit as at least one
20

determine from the face of the statute
whether Valansi’s conviction is among
those that qualify as an aggravated felony,
we must take the additional step of
examining the underlying facts to
determine whether Valansi pled guilty to
an offense involving fraud or deceit.

Taylor’s categorical approach.
Thus,
whatever disagreements there were within
the panel in Valansi, all agreed that the
case required a look beyond the literal
elements of 18 U.S.C. § 656.
c. A governing principle?
Our survey complete, the question we
now pose is whether these
decisions—some applying Taylor, some
not—can be reconciled under a governing
principle. We believe that they can. As
Taylor itself demonstrates, there are two
facets to these cases: the federal statute
enumerating categories of crimes on the
one hand (the “enumerating statute”), and
the criminal statute of conviction, whether
federal or state, on the other (the “statute
of conviction”). While Taylor’s formal
categorical approach presumptively
applies in comparing the two, under
certain conditions, both the enumerating
statute and the statute of conviction can
require a departure from the formal
categorical approach.

Valansi, 278 F.3d at 214 (alterations in
original). Ultimately, we concluded that
[i]n Valansi’s case, the specific
intent to defraud was not
established. It appears that Valansi
was counseled to avoid admitting to
that intent, and the plea colloquy
fails to pin down the mens rea
element sufficiently for us to
conclude that Valansi acted with
the intent to defraud rather than to
injure her employer.
Id. at 217. Accordingly, we granted the
petition for review.
In dissent, Judge Scirica concluded that
embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 656 is
always a crime of fraud or deceit, and
therefore had no need to analyze the
i n t e n t - t o - d e f r a u d / i n te n t - to - i n j u r e
distinction.
While this seems more
consistent with the formal categorical
approach of Taylor, Judge Scirica’s dissent
still relies on (1) the plea colloquy (to
establi sh that V alansi c om mitte d
embezzlement, and not “abstract[ion],
purloin[ing], or . . . misappli[cation]”), and
(2) the factual record (to establish the
fiduciary relationship between Valansi and
her employing bank necessary to satisfy
his definition of embezzlement). Both
steps are beyond the strict scope of

In the case of the enumerating statute,
a departure from the formal categorical
approach seems warranted when the terms
of the statute invite inquiry into the facts
underlying the conviction at issue. The
qualifier “in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000” in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) is the prototypical
example—it expresses such a specificity of
fact that it almost begs an adjudicator to
examine the facts at issue. This principle
explains our holdings in Nugent and
Munroe. Another example would be an
enumerating statute specifying crimes
“committed within the last two years.”
21

Such a statute could not be read to cover
only crimes which have “within the last
two years” as an element; instead, a court
would read “within the last two years” as
a limiting provision on crimes that would
otherwise qualify.

imprisonment is at least one year,” invites
inquiry into the alien’s actual sentence.
See Graham, 169 F.3d at 790-91. In
contrast, provisions like 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(J), which classifies as an
aggravated felony certain racketeering and
gambling offenses “for which a sentence
of one year imprisonment or more may be
imposed,” seem to direct inquiry toward
the statutory sentencing scheme, not the
alien’s actual sentence. See Graham, 169
F.3d at 790-91.

In contrast, cases interpreting relatively
unitary cate gorical c once pts— like
“forgery” (Drakes), “burglary” (Taylor
itself) or “crime of violence” (Francis and
Bovkun)—do not look to underlying facts
because the enumerating statute does not
invite any such inquiry. Likewise, the
hypothetical federal felony trilogy (Steele,
Gerbier, and Wilson) asks only whether
the elements of a federal criminal statute
can by satisfied by reference to the actual
statute of conviction; this presents no
invitation to depart from Taylor’s formal
categorical approach and examine the
underlying facts.

Turning to the statute of conviction,
there are also cases where a look into the
underlying facts—or at least the charging
instrument—is called for. Valansi is a
good example of such a case: There, the
statute of conviction was phrased in the
disjunctive—a mens rea of either intent to
defraud or intent to injure would suffice
for conviction—which, in our view, called
for an exploration of which of the
alternative elements was the actual basis
for conviction. Statutes phrased in the
disjunctive are akin to, and can be readily
converted to, statutes structured in outline
form, with a series of numbered or letter
elements. See, e.g., statutes cited supra
notes 8-10. Such statutes may sometimes
more clearly invite further inquiry into
exactly which subsection the defendant
violated.
The exercise of analyzing
disjunctive statutes for an invitation to
further inquiry is much more difficult than
that described in the preceding paragraphs,
for it poses the vexing question of how far
below the judgment or plea colloquy the
court may look. The cases are few and the
jurisprudence is not clear. However, in the
hope that it may shed some light on this

Though we have little case law on
point, the contrast we have described
appears to be mirrored in the references in
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) to the duration of
sentences. Correcting for the scrivener’s
error in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), we
held in Graham, 169 F.3d at 791, that that
section specifies theft and burglary
offenses “for which the term of
imprisonment [imposed is] at least one
year.” This obviously invites an inquiry
into the sentence actually imposed on the
alien, rather than a categorical inquiry into
the statutory punishment for the offense.
Similarly, provisions like 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(S), which classifies as an
aggravated felony certain obstruction of
justice offenses “for which the term of
22

troublesome area, we will do our best to
analyze the problem.

Taylor itself, in some ways, provides
an example. Taylor was convicted of
second-degree burglary under some
section of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560 (1969); the
Court remanded for consideration of
whether he was convicted under §§
560.045, .050, .055, .060, .070, .075, or
.080. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578 n.1. These
seven separate statutory sections, each of
which contained different factual
predicates for the same crime with the
same penalty, are in practice very similar
to a single statute defining a crime, with
seven numbered subsections containing
alternate factual predicates.
And in
Taylor, the Supreme Court found that this
division invited further inquiry.

We have used a numbered subsection
of such a statute as a statute of conviction
for purposes of the Taylor inquiry. See
Wilson, 350 F.3d at 381 (citing N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(11), which specifically
criminalizes marijuana).
In Wilson,
however, the numbered paragraphs of §
2C:35-5(b) were distinct offenses carrying
separate penalties, not alternate types of
conduct that constituted the same offense.
The lesson there is that sometimes
disjunctive parts of statutes of conviction
represent distinct offenses, with distinct
punishments. Where different crimes with
different penalties are involved, under the
categorical approach, further inquiry is
clearly invited into which particular crime
the petitioner was actually convicted of.

Since any statute that is phrased in the
disjunctive can be readily converted to
outline form, it would be strange to think
that Congress intended the application of
the categorical approach to turn on the
typography used by the statute’s drafters.
Commonly, the best way to resolve the
question raised by a conviction under a
statute phrased in the disjunctive, or
structured in outline form, will be to look
to the charging instrument or to a formal
guilty plea (as we did in Valansi, for
example). But even in such cases, we
have not taken the further step of looking
to facts outside the charging instrument or
further plea; we leave for another day the
question whether statutes phrased in the
disjunctive invite such inquiry beyond a
charging instrument or a formal plea.

In other statutes, disjunctive wording
or outline formatting simply describes
variations of the same offense, with no
difference in punishment and no
distinction on the judgment of conviction.
Even here, though, further inquiry might
be warranted, as we found in Valansi,
because the face of the statute might not
make clear whether the conviction
qualifies as an aggravated felony. It is not
clear that only those disjunctions reflected
in the penalty or the judgment of
conviction are relevant for the purposes of
§ 1101(a)(43); where some variations of
the crime of conviction meet the
aggravated-felony requisites and others do
not, we have thus allowed further inquiry
to see which variation was actually
committed.

As suggested above, our jurisprudence
is not a seamless web. In Wilson, we did
not conduct any further inquiry into the
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underlying facts of the conviction, even
though the statute at issue was phrased in
the disjunctive. As discussed above, the
petitioner had been convicted under N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1), which made it
unlawful “[t]o manufacture, distribute or
dispense, or to possess or have under his
control with intent to manufacture,
d i s t r i b u t e o r d i s p en s e , [ c er t a in
substances].” Despite this disjunctive
phrasing, we declined to examine whether
Wilson had engaged in distribution or
possession with the intent to distribute.
Subject to our discussion in the margin,13
this may be in tension with our earlier
decision in Valansi. But there may also be
other cases in which a statute phrased in
the disjunctive would not invite further
inquiry; we cannot with great confidence
draw any general rule on this point from
our cases.

Singh’s petition, we need not resolve the
matter, because Singh’s statute of
conviction is not phrased in the disjunctive
in a relevant way. The statute is phrased in
the disjunctive, both with respect to its
actus reus (which can be either (1) sexual
contact or (2) causing sexual contact) and
its mens rea
(which can be either (a) knowing that the
contact is offensive to the victim, or (b)
knowing that the contact occurs without
the victim’s consent). But none of this
gives insight into the question whether 11
Del. C. § 767 constitutes “sexual abuse of
a minor” because, though any combination
of actus reus and mens rea seem to suffice
as the actus reus and mens rea of “sexual
abuse,” the statute is silent on the critical
matter of the age of the victim.
2. Does the formal categorical approach
apply here?

At all events, for purposes of deciding

At long last, we come to the operative
question in this case: Does Taylor’s formal
categorical approach apply to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 11 Del. C. § 767?
We have already indicated that Singh’s
statute of conviction does not invite us to
go beyond the formal categorical
approach, because it is not phrased in the
disjunctive in a relevant way. Thus we
m u s t a s k w he th er 8 U .S.C .
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) (and specifically “sexual
abuse of a minor”) invites inquiry—that is,
whether it is more like the amount-of-loss
provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i),
or more like provisions for “burglary,” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), or “crime of
violence,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

13

It seems that, in Wilson, we declined
to take the disjunctive phrasing as an
invitation to make further inquiry
because the disjunctive words of N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1) did not
differentiate between offenses for
purposes of judgment and penalty (unlike
the numbered paragraphs of subsection
(b) of that statute, which carried separate
penalties). As noted above, however, it
is possible that a disjunctive definition of
a single offense, for state law purposes of
judgment and penalty, might nonetheless
invite further inquiry for the purposes of
§ 1101(a)(43)’s definition of an
aggravated felony.
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We think it clear that “sexual abuse of
a minor” belongs in the latter category.
First, it is listed in the same subsection as
“murder” and “rape,” two terms that share
the common law pedigree of “burglary,”
which was examined in Taylor itself.
Applying the maxim noscitur a sociis,14 we
would place “sexual abuse of a minor” in
a similar mold. Second, nothing in the
phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” signals
that a factual investigation is called for.
Congress could have enacted, for example,
the language “any sex offense, where the
victim of such offense was a minor”; such
language, parallel to provisions like 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) & (S), might
direct our inquiry into the facts of the
crime rather than its definition. Third, in
an area that so routinely implicates state
laws, Congress is presumed to legislate
against the backdrop of existing state
statutes. The widespread existence of state
statutes specifically criminalizing sexual
abuse of a minor, see, e.g., Ala. Code
§ 13A-6-67 (“Sexual abuse in the second
degree”); Cal. Penal Code § 288.5
(“Continuous sexual abuse of a child”); 11
Del. C. § 778 (“Continuous sexual abuse
of a child”); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312
(“Sexual abuse of children”), supports the
conclusion that Congress intended
Taylor’s formal categorical approach to be
applied in this case.

IV. Conclusion
In view of our conclusion in Part III.B
that Taylor’s formal categorical approach
applies to “sexual abuse of a minor” under
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) and 11 Del. C.
§ 767, our analysis in Part III.A stands:
Because§ 767 does not establish the age of
the victim, a conviction under that statute
is not the aggravated felony of sexual
abuse of a minor. Because Singh has not
been convicted of an aggravated felony,
we have jurisdiction and will grant the
petition for review.

14

“The meaning of a word is or may be
known from the accompanying words.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.
1990).
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